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Abstract 
Face recognition is a remarkable human ability, which underlies a great deal of our social 
behaviour. We can recognize family members, friends and acquaintances over a very large 
range of conditions, and yet the processes by which we do this remain poorly understood, 
despite decades of research.  Although a detailed understanding remains elusive, face 
recognition is widely thought to rely on ‘configural processing’, specifically an analysis of 
spatial relations between facial features (so-called second-order configurations). In this paper, 
we challenge this traditional view, raising four problems: (i) configural theories are under-
specified; (ii) large configural changes leave recognition unharmed; (iii) recognition is 
harmed by non-configural changes; (iv) in separate analyses of face-shape and face-texture, 
identification tends to be dominated by texture. We review evidence from a variety of sources 
and suggest that failure to acknowledge the impact of familiarity on facial representations 
may have led to an overgeneralization of the configural account. We argue instead that 
second-order configural information is remarkably unimportant for familiar face recognition. 
Keywords: Cognition, Mental Representation, Perception, Face Recognition, Configural 
Processing 
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Introduction 
 Face recognition is a fundamental human ability, which lies at the heart of our social 
world.  We can recognize the people we know, family, friends and colleagues, apparently 
without effort and across a huge range of conditions.  This ability underlies our everyday 
interactions, and allows us to tailor our behaviour continually. However, the ease with which 
we can recognize each other hides the difficulty of the task: how can we recognise a family 
member over changes in age, emotion and view?; how can we recognize the person in a 
photograph, a home movie or in the flesh?; how can we recognize the person in poor lighting 
or an unexpected place?  Although face recognition is not perfect over all these 
circumstances, it is nevertheless remarkably good, and errors are rare by comparison to 
successes.  
 Face perception has become a major focus for psychological research, and the topic 
attracts interest from a wide range of scientists: social, developmental, cognitive and 
perceptual psychologists as well as neuropsychologists and neuroscientists.  It is therefore 
perhaps surprising that we still know so little about the central question: how do we recognize 
the people we know?   In this article, we suggest that one reason for slow progress in this field 
lies in the willingness to recruit a misleading idea. ‘Configural processing’ is a key concept in 
face research. The central idea is that faces differ both in their constituent features (my mouth 
is different from your mouth), and also in their spatial layout (the distance between my mouth 
and nose is different from yours). Perception of the spatial layout underlies ‘configural 
processing’, and is held to be critical for recognising familiar faces. We argue below that the 
concept is problematic. After more than thirty years of use it remains poorly specified, and 
vague definitions have perhaps contributed to its general appeal, rendering it hard to 
challenge.  However, despite being difficult to pin down, we argue that there is now enough 
evidence to make the case that facial configurations are surprisingly unimportant in 
recognizing the faces of those people we know.  
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 Before we begin our critique of configural processing, it is important to point out that 
the study of face perception is much broader than the problem of familiar face recognition. As 
well as signalling identity, faces provide the viewer with information about expressions, facial 
speech, gender and focus of attention (via eye gaze).  Faces can be judged more or less 
attractive, and to display particular personality traits. There has been considerable progress in 
understanding the perception of these signals.  For example, the Oxford Handbook of Face 
Perception (Calder, Rhodes, Johnson, & Haxby, 2011) provides a comprehensive survey of 
the advances in a great many sub-fields of face perception.  Following an influential early 
analysis of face perception by Bruce and Young (1986) many researchers are clear that 
different facial judgements can be based on different sources of information; for example, 
there is no logical reason why the information used to decide that a face is smiling is the same 
as the information used to decide that it is Bill Clinton. In fact, there are good reasons to 
propose that these sources of information are to some extent different: we can judge a smile in 
both familiar and unfamiliar faces, just as we can judge gaze-direction and facial speech.   
Because there are very many judgements that can be made on all faces, it is important 
to be clear that we are concerned here only with the recognition of familiar faces (i.e. how can 
I recognize a picture of Bill Clinton?).  Because we plan to be critical of configural 
processing, it is important to spell out that we are only critical of it in this particular context.  
The concept has been recruited to explain a very wide range of phenomena, including all the 
various judgements listed above. In this article, we concentrate on the specific claim, 
commonly made in the literature, that familiar faces are recognized using the spatial layout of 
their features.  By recognition we mean the process of assigning an identity to any image of a 
known person, for example, ‘that’s Bill Clinton’, ‘that’s my wife’ or ‘that’s the person who 
works in the coffee bar’. This process is sometimes called ‘identification’ and sometimes 
‘individuation’, but for our purposes all these terms are equivalent, and we will use 
recognition throughout.  
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Configural Processing: history and definition 
We do not provide a thorough review of the literature on configural processing here.  
There are already many good overviews (for example McKone & Yovel, 2009; Piepers & 
Robbins, 2012; Tanaka & Gordon, 2011).  However, it will be helpful to recap the origins of 
configural processing, and how the concept gained such wide currency.  Early work on face 
processing tended to emphasize a distinction between featural and configural aspects of faces.  
Although neither of these terms was well defined, appeal was made to the everyday 
understanding of features (eyes, noses, mouths), and an intuitive notion of their configuration 
– that is, their spatial layout.  Early observations ruled out the possibility that face recognition 
relies entirely on individual facial features.  For example, familiar faces can be recognized 
from severely blurred images, in which it is difficult to see features clearly (Harmon, 1973).  
Even when viewers can see facial features clearly, early studies showed considerable 
sensitivity to subtle changes in their arrangement (Haig, 1984).   
It is well-established that faces are hard to recognize when presented upside-down, a 
phenomenon known as the ‘inversion effect’ (Yin, 1969).  Attempts to understand this effect 
have been closely linked to configural processing.  In addition to harming recognition, it turns 
out that inverting a face reduces viewers’ sensitivity to the spatial layout of features (Sergent, 
1984). This finding led Diamond and Carey (1986) explicitly to hypothesize that “the large 
effect of inversion on face recognition results from the fact that faces are individuated in 
terms of relational distinguishing features” (ibid., p. 108).   
To examine configural processing accounts of face recognition, we recruit the careful 
definitional distinctions made by Maurer et al. (2002), and adopted widely.  These authors 
distinguish three types of configural processing: (i) detection of ‘first-order’ relations, which 
define the basic arrangement of a face, that is the fact that face detection relies on a lay-out of 
features such that two eyes appear above a nose, which lies above a mouth; (ii) holistic 
processing, which coheres the features into a perceptual gestalt; and (iii) sensitivity to second 
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order relations, that is the specific spatial arrangement within the face or “perceiving the 
distances between features”.  These three types of processing are tapped by different 
perceptual tasks, and Maurer et al. demonstrate that they are behaviorally dissociable (though 
all of these are held to be affected by inversion).  
Although Maurer et al.’s analysis has been influential, there is still some lack of clarity 
in the literature about what precisely is meant by configural processing. Some authors use the 
terms ‘holistic’ and ‘configural’ interchangeably, and some are unclear about what form of 
configural processing is being recruited in an explanation for a particular effect.   Because we 
are, in this paper, concerned only with a configural account of familiar face recognition, we 
will adopt Maurer’s terminology, and make it clear that we are addressing only second-order 
configural processing here.  This is an important specification as, fortunately, some authors 
have been clear in framing the hypothesis linking second-order configural processing to 
recognition.  For example, Richler et al. (2009), write:  “Because faces are made from 
common features (eyes, nose, mouth, etc.) arranged in the same general configuration, subtle 
differences in spatial relations between face features being encoded [are] particularly useful 
for successful recognition of a given face.” (p. 2856).  These ‘subtle differences in spatial 
relations between features’ are precisely those identified by Maurer et al. as second-order 
configural properties.  Tanaka and Gordon (2011) are likewise clear in their definition: “We 
use the term ‘configural processing’ … to refer to encoding of metric distances between 
features (i.e. second-order relational properties)” (p. 178).   
Popularity of Configural Processing Explanations 
Why is face recognition so often explained in terms of configural processing?  One 
contributing factor is that there is rather good evidence for the involvement of holistic 
processes – the precedence of the whole face over its parts (see below). For example 
individual features are best remembered when they are embedded in a complete face, rather 
than in isolation (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Furthermore, when the top and bottom halves of 
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two different faces are aligned, these tend to fuse perceptually into a novel identity (Young et 
al., 1987), which in turn hampers the separate processing of individual halves relative to a 
non-aligned arrangement. This is known as the ‘composite effect’, and strongly suggests that 
face recognition recruits the entire percept, rather than extracting local features independent of 
one another.  The fact that viewers tend to see composite faces as a single person implies a 
role for one type configural processing (holistic), but it does not necessarily imply a role for 
the involvement of second-order processing.  
Another contributory factor may be that evidence is sometimes recruited from  face 
perception tasks other than recognition. For example, there are very many studies examining 
the effects of configural changes on unfamiliar face image-matching (i.e. judging whether two 
images are identical), and these normally demonstrate reduced sensitivity following inversion 
(e.g. Friere, Lee & Symons, 2000; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer & Brent, 2001; Rossion, 
2008).  Furthermore, there is debate about the exact nature of inversion effects, particularly as 
they affect configural processing (e.g. Goffaux & Dakin, 2010; Sekunova & Barton, 2008).  
However, all these studies examine a rather constrained task:  viewers are asked to report 
whether two images of unfamiliar faces, are identical or not, when they are upright or 
inverted.  There seems to be no very compelling reason to assume that the processes involved 
in that task capture the processes involved in recognizing a friend in the street.  Indeed, much 
evidence attests to dissociations between image recognition and face recognition, and between 
familiar and unfamiliar face processing. We return to these distinctions below.  Whether or 
not strict processing dissociations exist, familiar face recognition is undeniably a key part of 
our everyday perceptual experience.  One of our central hypotheses is that explanations for 
different tasks (e.g., identical image matching, or remembering unfamiliar face pictures) may 
have been over-generalized to account for the phenomenon of everyday recognition, which is 
both more commonplace, and more difficult to understand.  
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In addition to its intuitive appeal, a final reason for the popularity of configural 
accounts is probably the lack of a plausible alternative.  If we consider a face to comprise its 
features (e.g. a particular nose, a particular pair of eyes etc), and their spatial lay-out (e.g. the 
distances between these features), then we might ask how each of these sources of 
information contributes to the recognition of that face. Experimentally, one can selectively 
alter features (e.g. by inserting a new nose) or change their layout (by graphically altering the 
feature location), and both of these are clearly very important for the percept (for example see 
research on constructing a forensic likeness, e.g. Frowd et al., 2014).  Very early studies 
taking this approach established that recognition cannot be carried by features alone. 
(Bradshaw & Wallace, 1971; Matthews 1978; Sergent 1984).  These studies showed that the 
time required for a viewer to judge two faces to be different is not predictable from a simple 
addition of the component differences. Thus, even in the 1970s and 1980s, there was little 
enthusiasm for approaches to face recognition which relied primarily on features.  More 
recently, there have been some suggestions that one should consider the role of individual 
features more carefully (e.g. Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Rakover, 2002).   However, even these 
modern re-evaluations rely on an integration of featural and configural processing, and 
present little challenge to the view that configural processes are key to understanding face 
recognition.  
Given the history of face recognition research, one reason to retain a configuration-
based hypothesis is the lack of any other useful theory.  To avoid any narrative tension, we 
should point out that we are not going to propose a specific alternative here. Throughout this 
article we will briefly mention some alternative approaches that warrant further exploration. 
However, the validity of our critique of the configural approach to recognition does not rely 
on the reader’s accepting any particular alternative.   
Four Problems with the Configural Processing Approach 
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In what follows, we will consider four key problems with configural processing as a 
mechanism for familiar face recognition: (1) configural theories are under-specified; (2) large 
configural changes leave recognition unharmed; (3) recognition is harmed by non-configural 
changes; (4) in separate analyses of face-shape and face-texture, identification tends to be 
dominated by texture.  Problems 2 and 3 are two sides of the same issue, and each of the final 
three problems arise from well-established empirical evidence. However, we start with a more 
general problem, under-specificity, which has persisted over many years.  In the final section 
of the paper, we attempt to resolve these problems by suggesting fruitful approaches to future 
work.  
Problem 1: Configural theories are under-specified 
If faces are recognized by their ‘metric distances between features’, then one might 
expect researchers to operationalize this notion.  Exactly which distances are important?  In 
fact, this is never specified.  Authors sometimes provide an example, without any 
commitment to the specific distances used, for example, “nose to mouth distance” and “inter-
ocular distance” have been suggested as candidates for key spatial relations (Leder & Bruce, 
2000).  However, these suggestions are intended only to make a general appeal to an intuitive 
notion of spatial layout.  McKone and Yovel (2009), provide more detailed examples by 
suggesting landmark points within the face – however, these authors are concerned to explain 
inversion, rather than identification, and even these points are specifically flagged as being 
‘theoretical ideas’ rather than the actual distances which might be used in face perception.  
FIGURE 1 HERE PLEASE 
To illustrate the problem Figure 1 shows an attempt to characterize three well-known 
faces in terms of distance metrics drawn from the literature. The figure shows very clearly 
that these distances simply do not discriminate between three very different faces.  The 
problem is that distances between features show as much within-person variability 
(differences between different photos of the same person) as between-person variability 
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(differences between photos of different people) – meaning these distances are not useful for 
discriminating between the individuals.  Some of the within-person variability in Figure 1 is 
due to changes in facial expression, which affect the location of reference points (e.g. corners 
of the mouth). Figure 2 shows a complementary analysis based on standardized interocular 
distance – a measure that is invariant across expression. Once again, within-person variability 
is as large as between-person variability, presumably due to differences in viewing distance 
and properties of the camera lens (e.g. Harper & Latto, 2001). Of course, we understand that 
no proponent of configural processing would claim that these particular distances are 
necessary or sufficient for discriminating between people.  But without some commitment to 
a measurement that could be used in this way, it is impossible to evaluate the claim that 
metric distances are important in face recognition.  In fact, after so many years of use without 
specification, one wonders whether the concept could ever be operationalized.   
FIGURE 2 HERE PLEASE 
In the early days of automatic face recognition research, approaches based on the 
metric distances between features were tried many times (Kanade, 1973; Kelly, 1970).  
However, these consistently failed to produce workable solutions.  No group has ever found a 
set of facial measures which uniquely identify one person – being similar across instances of 
that person, and different from everyone else.  Modern-day automatic systems rely much 
more heavily on reflectance-based information (see Zhao et al., 2003) and we return to this 
approach below.  Similarly, an approach to recognition based on measurements between 
features (‘anthropometry’) has been shown to be unworkable in forensic identification 
(Kleinberg et al., 2007).   Neither of those fields (computing or forensics) has any 
commitment to particular theories of human face perception. They have moved away from 
metric distances between features for the entirely practical reason that it does not work. It is, 
of course, possible that new research will be published one day that specifies a set of 
measurements that are stable enough to be useful in uniquely identifying someone.  However, 
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progress to date has not been promising, and many researchers in face recognition apparently 
ignore this fact, recruiting configural processing as a theoretical tool without any 
operationalization to use, and no attempt to develop one.  
Problem 2:  Large configural changes leave recognition unharmed 
If recognition relies on ‘subtle differences in spatial relations between features’, then it 
follows that disrupting these spatial relations should harm recognition.  However, this is not 
borne-out by the evidence. Instead, recognition of familiar faces appears to be remarkably 
robust under a range of deformations.  
One of the most powerful demonstrations shows that stretching images in the x- or y- 
direction (so they are too wide or too tall) has no effect on recognition whatever.  Participants 
show no reduction in speed or accuracy to make a familiarity judgement when the image is 
stretched up to twice its normal vertical height (Hole et al., 2002).  This finding is truly 
remarkable.  Such a transformation deforms almost all ‘metric distances between features’.  
All angles, ratios of distances, and measures (except those in one dimension) are entirely lost.  
A stretch of up to twice the normal height of an image introduces changes to all metric 
distance between features which must far exceed the differences in these measures between 
people.  
It could be argued that a simple linear stretch is not really so profound a distortion of a 
facial image. Some non-linear deformations do make face recognition harder (for example, 
shearing, in which a rectangular photo is ‘slanted’ to the left or right; Hole et al., 2002).  
Perhaps the visual system is able to undo the effects of linear stretch before the face 
recognition system is recruited.  However, this is a circular argument.  One does not know, 
when looking at an image, what its true aspect-ratio should be.  In order to re-scale a photo of 
Elvis correctly, one would need first to recognize it as Elvis – and to recruit his characteristic 
metric distances in order to discount the transformation in these distances.  So, the robustness 
of recognition across even this rather simple transformation is a considerable challenge to 
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configural accounts of recognition.  This robustness can be found in more fundamental 
measures of recognition. An early ERP component sensitive to the repetition of individual 
familiar faces, the N250r, is equivalent whether a target face was preceded by a veridical or a 
stretched prime face (Bindemann et al., 2008).  Somehow, the neural processes involved in 
priming a representation of a familiar face are able to discount this severe alteration to the 
spatial layout of features.  
FIGURE 3 HERE PLEASE  
In fact, face recognition is well-established to be robust over much more complex 
transformations than linear stretch.  Figure 3 (after Harper & Latto, 2001) shows the effect of 
simply changing the distance from the camera to the subject.  Such a change in perspective is 
typically not even noticed by a familiar viewer, but is only apparent when one sees multiple 
photos of the same person together. However, it is clear that the spatial layout between 
features is changed in rather complex, non-linear ways.  Once again, the size of these 
transformations produce changes which presumably exceed the differences between people – 
a severe problem for a configural account of recognition.  
In some recent work, we have been able to test a very simple hypothesis, derived from 
a configural processing account of recognition (Sandford & Burton, 2014).  Images of faces 
are shown to viewers in the wrong aspect ratio (either ‘too wide’ or ‘too tall’).  These appear 
in a computer window, and the participants’ task is simply to resize them, using a mouse to 
drag the corner of the window,  “until they look right”.  From a configural theory of 
recognition, we hypothesized that this task would be a much easier for familiar than for 
unfamiliar faces.  If we really differentiate those we know by the ‘subtle differences in spatial 
relations between face features’ then one should be able to adjust these images more 
accurately for a known face than for an unfamiliar one, whose spatial arrangement is 
unknown.   In fact, across a series of experiments, we found no evidence for this prediction.  
In general, viewers were very poor at the task, being satisfied to resize the images rather 
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inaccurately. In some experiments, participants made greater errors for familiar than 
unfamiliar faces, while in others there was no difference.  Furthermore, the task was shown to 
be sensitive to familiarity in other stimuli: when viewers were asked to resize company 
trademarks, they were able to do this more accurately for familiar than unfamiliar items.  
Thus, far from relying on accurate, detailed knowledge of the metric distances between 
features, viewers accept as veridical a very large range in these distances.  In summary, it 
seems that viewers are very tolerant of distortions to familiar faces – different types of 
change, some of them rather large, seem not to harm recognition at all.  
Problem 3: Recognition is harmed by non-configural changes 
In contrast to the results discussed in the previous section, there are a number of 
situations in which recognition is severely impaired by changes which leave facial 
configuration unaltered. We consider the effects of photographic negation, line drawings, and 
the odd effects of caricature.   
It has been known for many years that it is very hard to recognize a face in 
photographic negative (Galper, 1970).  However, if faces are recognized through the metric 
distances between their features, it is not straightforward to explain why this should be so.  
Exactly the same information is present in photographic positives and negatives, and viewers 
have no difficulty pointing out the eyes, noses and mouths etc.  Negation does reduce 
viewers’ ability to distinguish between two face images with different spatial distances 
between features, that is second-order configural properties (Kemp et al. 1990).  However, it 
is not clear why this should be.  Furthermore, the effect is additive to an effect of inversion, 
suggesting the two effects have different loci (Kemp et al., 1990).  Altogether, it is hard to see 
why a system that can extract differences within a plane would be challenged by a 
transformation that leaves these distances unchanged.  In fact, later explanations of the 
photographic negation effect dispense with configural accounts altogether (Bruce & Langton, 
1994; Johnston et al., 1992; Kemp et al., 1996).  Instead, these accounts place the weight of 
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the effect in the perception of pigmentation and shape, based on the perceptual assumption 
that light shining from above illuminates surfaces in predictable ways. These explanations fit 
with an account of recognition that is not tied closely to configuration, but rather relies on 
what we will call ‘texture’ in the following section.  
A second transform of interest is the effect of presenting faces as line drawings. For 
example, drawings traced from facial photographs, are recognized rather poorly (Davies et al., 
1978;  Rhodes et al., 1987). In itself, this is a rather interesting problem: line drawings 
preserve spatial layout, so perhaps a configural account of recognition should predict good 
recognition. In fact, simple introduction of ‘mass’, that is black shading introduced by 
luminance-thresholding an image, significantly improves performance (Bruce et al., 1992).  
This thresholding provides no additional information about the spatial layout of features, 
suggesting that the marked improvement in recognition is being driven by non-configural 
processing. The boost to performance seems likely to be based on information about the 
surface reflectance of the face, rendered at its simplest in this manipulation.  
Finally, we consider the effect of spatial caricature – in which the location of points 
within a face are exaggerated with respect to a prototype, usually the average of many faces.  
The caricature technique produces images in which the distinctive aspects of a face are 
enhanced, that is distinctive feature shapes and distinctive distances between these features 
are made even more distinctive. Under some circumstances, caricatures of known people are 
better recognized than the originals (for an overview, see Rhodes, 1996). This effect is 
sometimes taken as evidence for configural processing – though at first sight it is hard to 
imagine how this could work.  The caricature transformation, by its nature, affects some parts 
of the face more than others, introducing a very complex transformation – for example, if 
someone has large nose but an average mouth, then the caricature changes the nose 
considerably, but leaves the mouth unaltered.  Such alterations would seem to change the 
metric distance between features quiet considerably, and in rather complex fashion.  For the 
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effect to be consistent with configural processing, it would seem that one would need to 
define configuration in much more complex ways than ‘metric distances between the 
features’.  
In fact, it is interesting to note that spatial caricaturing appears to work best when the 
image is degraded in some way.  The technique was originally developed for line drawings 
(Brennan, 1985), and caricatured drawings of familiar faces were recognised faster than 
drawings that preserved the original spatial layout of features (Rhodes, Brennan & Carey, 
1987). At that time, photorealistic caricaturing was not available, but the interpretation of 
poorer recognition performance found for caricatured line drawings (when compared to 
veridical photographs) may exemplify the strong focus on spatial information for face 
recognition by researchers at that time:  “…these results may simply mean that photographs 
contain so much more spatial information than hand-drawn caricatures that they are more 
recognizable despite being less distinctive” (Rhodes et al., 1987, p. 475; emphasis ours). In 
fact, a similar recognition speed advantage for spatial caricatures over undistorted images 
turned out to be hard to replicate in the case of photorealistic images that contain texture 
information, unless one makes the recognition task particularly difficult (Benson and Perrett, 
1991; Calder et al.,1996; Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2008; Rhodes et al., 1997).   Overall 
then, evidence from caricaturing provides little support for a strong role of spatial information 
in the recognition of (undegraded) images of faces. 
Problem 4: In separate analyses of face-shape and face-texture, identification 
tends to be dominated by texture.  
In the Introduction, we noted that computational approaches to face recognition 
typically do not attempt to solve the problem by analysing the spatial relations between 
features. In fact, many computational approaches separate face ‘shape’ and ‘texture’, and a 
variety of methods have been used to achieve this (Beymer, 1995; Burton et al., 2001; Vetter 
& Troje, 1995).  Figure 4 shows one way in which this operation can be performed. In this 
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example, shape is defined as a set of anatomical points in an image, and these are marked up 
(usually by hand) for all images in the set. A common shape is then defined: often the average 
shape of all set members.  Using standard face morphing techniques, each face is then 
deformed to the same common shape.  (Technically, this is achieved by warping the color, or 
grey levels, contained in each triangle of the source image, so that it fits the shape of the 
corresponding triangle of the target shape, for details see Beale & Keil, 1995.)  The resulting 
images are often called ‘shape-free’ faces, because their shape is common – that is one cannot 
use simple shape to discriminate between the faces in figure 4b. This procedure allows 
separate analysis of shapes (grid points prior to morphing) and ‘shape-free faces’ in which 
shape and feature placement align for all faces in the analysis.  The information remaining in 
these ‘shape-free’ images is difficult to name, because it includes texture, color, reflectance, 
and information based on the capture device.  We use the term ‘texture’ here as a short-hand 
for all these, while acknowledging that other authors use different terms.  
FIGURE 4 HERE PLEASE 
Separation of face shape and texture is usually performed as a computational 
convenience, since it allows faces to be normalized prior to some statistical treatment, such as 
principal components analysis (Burton et al., 1999; Calder et al., 2001).  However, a few 
computational studies have explicitly compared the diagnostic information carried in the 
shape and texture components separately, and in these cases information in the texture 
components has been found to dominate recognition of identity (Calder et al., 2001; Hancock 
et al., 1996; Taschereau-Dumnouchel et al., 2010).  
There are also some studies in which the separate contributions of shape and texture 
have been tested in the recognition of familiar people, many of these exploiting standard ERP 
effects in face perception. Results suggest that shape is important in learning a face, but once 
learned, plays rather little role in recognition. For example, spatial caricaturing (with texture 
unchanged) has a clear ERP effect for unfamiliar faces (more negative occipitotemporal P200 
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and N250 responses), but no effect on familiar faces (Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2008). 
Recognition performance has also been shown to be better for naturally distinctive faces than 
for spatially caricatured faces (Schulz, Kaufmann, Walther, & Schweinberger, 2012), 
suggesting that non-spatial distinctive information (i.e., texture) plays a significant role in 
recognition. In line with this idea, Itz, Schweinberger, Schultz & Kaufmann (2014) directly 
contrasted the effects of spatial caricaturing with texture caricaturing (i.e. exaggerating 
luminance and coloration, while leaving shape unchanged). Faces were learned in one of three 
versions (veridical, spatially caricatured, or texture-caricatured) and later recognized among 
analogous versions of non-learned unfamiliar faces.  Recognition performance for learned 
faces was best for the texture-caricatured version (when compared to both the spatially 
caricatured and veridical versions).   
The experiments considered so far in this section look at separation of ‘shape’ and 
‘texture’ (or ‘reflectance’) in photographic stimuli.  But 2d photographs are generated from 
the projection of 3d objects, and some researchers have examined the information carried in 
the 3d shape itself (i.e. the pure spatial layout) without any surface texture. For example, 
graphically-rendered 3d busts of familiar people are rather poorly recognized by viewers – 
and much less-well recognized than photos of faces taken in corresponding poses (Bruce et 
al., 1991). More sophisticated technology allows simultaneous capture of 3d shape and 
surface reflectance, and it is possible to view each independently (O’Toole et al., 1999; 
O’Toole, 2011).  Figure 5 shows independent representations of these two face components 
(Hill, Bruce & Akamatsu, 1995). Research with these types of images consistently shows that 
texture components dominate recognition of identity.  For example, in figure 5, the shape of a 
particular person is rendered highly accurately, whereas the texture is mapped to a rectangle.  
Despite this, people are still better at recognizing the person in the texture than in the shape.  
Similarly, when shape and texture are mismatched so that one person’s texture is ‘wrapped 
around’ another’s shape, viewers’ identity judgements seem to rely almost entirely on texture, 
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with very little effect of 3d shape (see Bruce and Young, 2012).  Once again, such 
demonstrations suggest that the spatial layout of the 3d features does not provide a strong cue 
to recognizing a familiar person.  
FIGURE 5 HERE PLEASE 
Resolution 
We have now provided rather varied evidence suggesting that familiar face recognition 
is unlikely to be achieved by configural processing, at least as it is currently understood.  We 
have raised four problems with the account, the final three of which depend on empirical data.  
In this final section, we consider the appeal of configural processing, and attempt to offer a 
more positive direction for future research.  
‘Configuration’ is a concept that maps most easily onto a specific instance of a face (a 
particular photo say) rather than a generic representation. Given a photo of a face, it is 
relatively straightforward to imagine measuring key distances within it.  Let us take for 
example, the distance between the corner of the nose and the corner of the mouth – simply 
because it is one of the distances mentioned by Leder and Bruce (2000).  This distance will 
clearly change – through changes in expression and speech and, over longer time periods, 
changes in health and age.  Thus, it seems like a very bad candidate for differentiating 
between people – it is so elastic within a person, that this variability would surely exceed that 
between people. However, at the core of configural theories of face recognition is the 
assumption that,  for key distances between features, within-person variability (what is 
different about two images of the same person) is negligible when compared to between-
person variability (what is different about two images of different people).  This assumption 
seems unwarranted.  For example, Jenkins et al. (2011) demonstrate much larger within- than 
between- person variability on a number of face dimensions, and on the perception of these 
(see also Burton et al., 2011; Burton 2013; Jenkins & Burton, 2011). In fact, we hold that it is 
a failure to acknowledge within-person facial variability that has misled us into believing that 
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the problem of face recognition is essentially the problem of distinguishing between two face 
images.  
We propose that a full account of face recognition will rely on two fundamental 
principles: first, the processes involved in perception of familiar and unfamiliar faces are, to 
some extent, different; and second, in order to understand familiar face recognition, it is 
necessary to understand how faces vary not only between-person, but also within-person.  The 
two proposals emerge from work showing that unfamiliar face perception relies to a large 
extent on pictorial representations (Hancock et al., 2000; Megreya & Burton, 2006, 2007).  
Our perception of an unfamiliar face seems to be tied quite strongly to a particular image of 
that face.  So, when trying to remember someone, or match two images of that person, 
performance is severely impaired if the two images are not identical (i.e., photos taken at 
different times, or under different conditions). In contrast, familiar face recognition relies on 
more robust representations. Our recognition generalizes across a very large range of images 
– including poor quality images in novel contexts (Burton et al., 1999).  This ability to 
generalize suggests that representations of familiar faces are more abstract than those for 
unfamiliar faces – they survive surface changes, and seem to rely on properties which can be 
extracted from a wide range of individual photos.  
This distinction between familiar and unfamiliar faces may hold the key to 
understanding the role of configural processing in face recognition.  If one focuses entirely on 
the problem of telling faces apart, then it is relatively straightforward to imagine how 
configural processing is an attractive candidate.  However, it is only when one sees multiple 
images of people, all perfectly recognisable, that it becomes clear that configural differences 
within different images of a person’s face can far exceed configural differences between 
people (see figure 6). We proposed above that second-order configuration is a property of an 
image not of a face (figures 1 and 2). Images are unchanging, and it is easy to see how one 
can make measurements on a particular photo – what is harder to see is how such 
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measurements generalize across different photos of the same face.  Since image-level analysis 
is prevalent in perception of unfamiliar faces, it may be that configural processing is engaged 
when the viewer does not know the face, even though it is not critical when the viewer does 
know the face.   
FIGURE 6 HERE PLEASE 
We do not intend to develop this theoretical position further here. Our critique of 
configural processing does not depend on providing an alternative account of face 
recognition. But neither is it a counsel of despair.  We have shown how it is possible to 
examine different components of the face, without relying on ‘metric distances between 
features’.  Indeed, our consideration of texture, in the previous section, is one such approach.   
Importantly, we note that a rejection of the under-specified configural account does not imply 
that a holistic approach to face recognition should be abandoned.  We simply emphasize that 
there are many theoretical possibilities, such as those based on image statistics (e.g. Hancock 
et al., 1996; Turk & Pentland, 1991), in which faces are built of component parts, but these 
parts all contain information that crosses the whole face. One of the most compelling pieces 
of evidence for whole face processing is the composite face effect (Young et al., 1987, and 
see Rossion, 2013 for a recent methodological review), and the arguments presented here are 
all consistent with a holistic processing account of recognition.  
We have been careful to specify that the arguments above refer only to familiar face 
recognition, and to point out that tasks relying on picture-level analysis are more plausible 
candidates for a configural approach.  However, it is certainly possible that there are other 
phenomena in face perception which are vulnerable to similar criticisms. For example, while 
we have been generally supportive of holistic processing accounts throughout this paper, it is 
true that these too, tend to be poorly specified. We propose that future theoretical proposals 
need to be much more tightly-specified, in at least two regards.  First, any account relying on 
metric distances should provide an analysis of which specific distances are intended.  Without
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candidates for an operationalization of a theoretical concept, any such account remains 
uncompelling.  Second, it is probably time to abandon circularity in these accounts. To take 
one example, it is not clear that the configural processing account of inversion is actually an 
account of the phenomenon.  A statement that configural processes are not recruited when 
viewing inverted faces is rather unsatisfying if one cannot say more. What exactly is not 
recruited, and why?  
One well-studied inversion phenomenon is the Thatcher Illusion (Thompson, 1980; 
see the original paper, or Bruce and Young, 2012, for examples) in which inverting the eyes 
and mouth of a photo renders it grotesque – a perception that disappears when the entire face 
is then inverted. In a recent review, Peter Thompson, inventor of the illusion, commented: ‘I 
have often been asked why the effect occurs, and have often recited the mantra of configural 
coding not being available when faces are turned upside down, but my heart isn’t really in the 
explanation’ (Thompson et al., 2009, p. 932). Thirty years after the effect was first reported, 
this reflects a spectacular lack of progress.  At the very least, we hope this article will spur 
those who disagree with us to provide a more detailed specification of configural processing.  
But our true hope is to have persuaded readers that, for familiar face recognition, the 
configural account is wrong.  
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Figure legends 
 
Fig. 1. Metric distances between features for three well known faces in three different photos 
each. Red lines show distance between the corner of the eye and the edge of the nose (left and 
right; Leder & Carbon, 2006), distance between the corner of the nose and the corner of the 
mouth (left and right; Leder & Bruce, 2000), and distance between the nose and the mouth 
(Leder & Carbon, 2006). Facial landmarks are not normally well defined, leaving ambiguity 
in their placement. Here we define the corner of the eye as the center of the canthus, the 
corner of the nose as the lateral extent of the nasal flange, and the corner of the mouth as the 
lateral extent of the vermillion zone. Nose-to-mouth distance is defined as the vertical length 
of the philtrum from the procheilon to the nasal septum. Photo size is standardized so that 
interocular distance (the distance between the center of the left pupil and the center of the 
right pupil, a-b) is the same for all images. Metric distances between features are expressed as 
proportions of standardized interocular distance. For all five measures, within-person ranges 
are large and overlapping, despite constrained pose. Thus, none of the metrics is 
individuating, even for these very dissimilar faces. 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONFIGURAL PROCESSING 
 
30 
Fig. 2. Metric distances between the eyes for three well known faces in three different photos 
each. Photo size is standardized so that iris diameter (a-b) is the same for all images. Distance 
between the lateral edge of the left iris (a) and the lateral edge of the right iris (red line) is 
expressed as a multiple of standardized iris diameter. Within-person ranges for this metric are 
large and overlapping, so that the metric is not individuating. 
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Fig. 3. Top row: Images of the same person taken at difference distances (c. 0.5m to 3m).  
From Burton (2013).  Bottom row: middle and right-most images overlain to standardize right 
eye and nose between images, respectively.  Poor registration shows the extent of the 
differences between these images, even in apparently stable measures. For example, simply 
altering the viewing distance leads to large changes in the distances between the eyes, 
between nose and mouth, and all measures depicted in Figure 1  
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Fig. 4a.  Decomposition of a face image into shape and texture components.  From Burton et 
al., (2005). 
 
 
Fig. 4b.  Two further celebrities whose shape has been morphed to the same common shape 
template (from Burton et al., 2005). Images depict Susan Sarandon and Sylvester 
Stallone. 
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Fig. 5.  Facial surface data captured by a 3D scanner.  Information is gathered from a camera 
which rotates around the head.  This delivers xyz co-ordinates which can be rendered as a 
surface (left), and color information which can either be mapped onto that surface, or 
displayed as a color map (right).  Figure from Bruce and Young (2012).  
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Fig. 6. Ambient photos of UK Prime Minister David Cameron.  All images used under 
Creative Commons or Open Government Licence.  Attributions (top row left to right, bottom 
row left to right):  The Department for Culture, Media and Sport [CC-BY-2.0]; Zasitu (Own 
work) [CC-BY-SA-4.0]; English Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Open Government 
Licence v1.0]; Richard J. Cole [CC-BY-SA-3.0]; Umakanth Jaffna (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-
4.0]; English Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Open Government Licence v1.0]; 
Willwal.Willwal at en.wikipedia [GFDL]; Russell Watkins/Department for International 
Development [CC-BY-SA-2.0]; English Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Open 
Government Licence v1.0]; The Department for Culture, Media and Sport [CC-BY-2.0]; 
English Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Open Government Licence v1.0]; 
Xtrememachineuk at en.wikipedia [Public Domain]. 
 
 
 
 
